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This paper investigates whether there are country-specific characteristics in goal-scoring in 
the final stage of important international football matches. We examine goal-scoring from 
1960 onwards in full ‘A’ international matches of six national teams: Belgium, Brazil, England, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. We analyze qualifying matches for the European 
Championship and World Cup and the matches at the final tournaments of these two events, 
the Copa America and the Confederations Cup. We find that the national teams of Germany, 
England and the Netherlands are more likely than the three other national teams to score in 
the last minute – including stoppage time. However, for Germans this comes at a cost. 
Germany is more likely to concede a goal in the dying seconds of a match than other 
countries. During our period of analysis, the national teams of Brazil and Italy only conceded 
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There are clear analogies between sports economics and labor economics. As Kahn (2000)
indicates professional sports oers a unique opportunity for labor market research, for ex-
ample to establish the impact of incentives on behavior. According to Szymanski (2003)
sports provide information about labor market behavior. Winning a sporting contest de-
pends on relative, not on absolute performance. Talent will migrate to wherever it is most
valued. This general rule may apply to club teams, but, apart from some naturalization it
does not apply to national teams. National teams are dierent from club teams. Players
are not bought and sold; their eligibility to play depends on their nationality. Once a
player has represented a country by playing for the national `A' team in a non-friendly
match, the player is not allow to play in a dierent national team. Thus, national teams
have more or less exogenously given resources as the labor market for players is restricted
on the basis of nationality.
Playing for the national `A' team is never the main job. However, there are clear
incentives to participate in national teams because the market value, i.e. earnings capacity
goes up once a player has been selected for a national team. Furthermore, it is usually
considered such an \honor" to be chosen that hardly any player declines an invitation. So,
one would expect that the performance of national teams is related to talent skills and not
to incentives. The common element within a team is the team spirit since (most) players
share the same \national identity" whatever this may be. In our paper we investigate
country-specic goal-scoring in important international football matches. We focus on
goal-scoring in the \dying seconds" because there the national identity becomes apparent.
Italian teams are well-known for their defensive tactics, while Brazilian and Dutch teams
are famous for their beautiful style of play while Germans have built a reputation of
persistence and conviction never to give up before the \nal whistle".
The link between goal-scoring behavior of football players and behavior of individual
workers is not straightforward. Whereas in the case of goal scoring in the last minute there
is almost an immediate eect of eort on results for common workers this is less obvious.
Workers putting in eort in their job will not immediately experience the results from this
eort. Nevertheless, from our paper it will become clear that national identity inuence
the behavior of football players. When explaining cross-country dierences in economic
2performance this may be taken into account.
We investigate the goal-scoring in the last minute(s) of football matches by analyzing
goal-scoring in more than 1500 important football matches which the national teams of
Belgium, Brazil, England, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands played since 1960.1 These
matches included qualiers for the European and World Cup, and matches at the nal
tournaments of either of these two events, the Copa America and the Confederations Cup.
Table 1 shows the importance of these countries in international football in the past ve
decades. Three are big football countries who won the World Cup several times { Brazil
four times, Germany and Italy both twice. These countries also nished as runner-up at
other occasions { Germany four times, Italy twice. The Netherlands have an intermediate
status as they won the European Championship in 1988 and reached the nal of the World
Cup twice (in 1974 and 1978). The other two countries are small football countries, who
only reached a nal once in the past 50 years, England in 1966 winning the World Cup
and Belgium in 1980 losing the European Championship nal.
The set-up of our paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide anecdotal evidence of
the importance of goal-scoring in the nal minutes of important international football
matches. Section 3 briey discusses previous studies. Section 4 gives a description of our
data and presents parameter estimates. As we show, our empirical analysis indicates that
there is indeed evidence of German goal-scoring in the nal stages of football matches not
being just a myth. We also provide evidence of a home advantage. National teams that
play at home are more likely to score goals and more likely to win their matches. Section
5 presents information from penalty shootouts. In Section 6 we explain our ndings and
conclude.
2 Anecdotal evidence
Other than one might think, the ability to score goals in the last minutes is not randomly
distributed across countries. There is abundant anecdotal evidence on this, especially re-
garding the impressive performance of the German national team. As Gary Lineker has
1The four continental European countries are praised for their contribution to the development of
football tactics (Kuper and Szymanski, 2009). England is the country where professional football started.
Brazil plays football beyond comprehension.
3stated: \Football is a simple game; 22 men chase a ball for 90 minutes and at the end,
the Germans win."2 Michel Platini, the current chairman of the UEFA (Union of Euro-
pean Football Associations) once said: \When the Germans play well they become world
champion; if they play poor they reach the nal."3 The German success is partly owing
to their ability to score goals in the nal minutes, which provoked the Dutch comedian
Youp van 't Hek to the statement that \Germans are only defeated when the bus has
taken them out of town." Vergouw (2006) presents an analysis of the myths surrounding
the (West-)German national team. One of these myths is that, in crucial matches, the
Germans often score in the nal minute.
The rst occasion on which the (West-)German national football team decided an
important match in the nal stages was the 1954 World Cup nal in Bern (Switzerland).
Attacker Helmut Rahn scored the winning goal (3-2) against Hungary in the eighty-fth
minute. After only eight minutes, the \Mighty Magyars" had been ahead 2-0. Even this
early Hungarian lead did not prevent West-Germany from winning their rst World Cup.
Some commentators even consider this event as the true beginning of the new Federal
Republic of Germany after the second World War. The general feeling that the Federal
Republic of Germany was to be taken serious again boosted condence and was a stimulus
to the miraculous post-war economic development, the so called \Wirtschaftswunder"
2Gary Lineker (1960) played as a striker for Leicester City FC, Everton FC, FC Barcelona, Tottenham
Hotspur FC and Nagoya Grampus Eight. He scored 282 goals in 567 ocial club matches, as well as 48
goals in 80 appearances for England. Lineker has won the European Cup Winners' Cup with FC Barcelona
(1989). With the English national team, he reached the semi-nals of the 1990 World Cup, in which they
were beaten by West-Germany, after a penalty shoot-out. On this occasion, he is supposed to have made
the cited statement. Nowadays, Lineker is the anchor man of the BBC program Match of the Day, which
broadcasts highlights of Premier League matches.
3Michel Platini (1955) played for AS Nancy-Lorraine, AS Saint-Etienne and Juventus FC. Platini has
won the European Cup (1985) and the European Cup Winners Cup with Juventus (1984). With the French
national team, he won the European Championship in 1984, while reaching the semi-nals of the World
Cup in 1982 and 1986. On both occasions, West-Germany dashed the French World Cup dreams, in 1982,
via a penalty shoot-out, in 1986, by a victory in regular time. Platini was voted European Footballer of
the Year a record three times (shared with Johan Cruij and Marco van Basten). He managed France
during a successful qualication campaign for Euro 1992. Disappointing results in the nal tournament
induced him to resign. Since January 2007, he has been the president of the UEFA, the Union of European
Football Associations.
4(Heinrich, 2003).
Thirty-six years later, West-Germany won their third World Cup by beating Argentina,
captained by Maradona, in the nal in Rome. Defender Brehme scored the decisive goal
from the penalty spot, again in the eighty-fth minute. Only the second World Cup win,
in 1974 in Munich against the Netherlands, did not require a late decision. However,
striker Gerd M uller scored the winning goal just two minutes prior to the end of the rst
half. Once more, the Germans had caught their opponents by surprise when the latter
thought that the match was almost over.
In the course of history, (West-)Germany also lost four World Cup nals, viz. in 1966,
1982, 1986 and 2002. The 1966 World Cup nal is, of course, most of all famous for the
dubious third England goal, in Germany still indicated as the Wembley Tor. However, the
Germans scored a crucial goal in the last minute of a match. Home-country England were
leading by 2-1 and were close to victory in the World Cup, when defender Wolfgang Weber
scored the equalizer. Nevertheless, England won the World Cup, with striker Geo Hurst
scoring two goals in extra time. In 1986, Argentina were still trailing West-Germany 2-0
after three fourths of the match, but attacker Karl-Heinz Rummenigge and striker V oller
restored German hopes. However, now the German national team lost a World Cup nal in
the eighty-fth minute, as Burruchaga did not let the great chance provided by Maradona
slip away.
During the preliminary matches for the 1970 World Cup, West-Germany were about to
lose a costly point away in Cyprus, on November 23, 1968. However, striker Gerd M uller
scored the winning goal in the nal minute, thus preventing a major German failure. Italy
were trailing West-Germany 1-0 one minute from the end of the match in the semi-nal
of the 1970 World Cup in Mexico. The Italians already thought they had reached the
World Cup nal, when defender Schnellinger equalized. Two things are remarkable about
this goal. First, this (West-)German player had earned his income in the Italian serie A
during the preceding seven years, playing for Mantova, AS Roma and AC Milan. Second,
this was the rst and, as it turned out later, only international goal of the solid defender.
Yet, the Italians still reached the nal, beating West-Germany 4-3 after extra time.
In the European Championship nal in 1976 in Belgrade, Czechoslovakia were trailing
(West-)Germany 2-0 after twenty-ve minutes. Via Dieter M uller, Germany soon scored
5the catching-up goal, but attacker H olzenbein only equalized in the very last minute of
the match. No goals were scored in extra time. Czechoslovakia beat West-Germany in the
penalty series (5-3), the only time the Germans ever lost in a penalty shootout during a
major tournament.
A decade later, France were caught by surprise, viz. by an early goal from defender
Brehme in the semi-nal of the World Cup in Mexico in 1986. However, the decision in
this match came from a goal by striker V oller in the last minute. Just like in 1982, the
(West-)Germans had blocked the French entry into the nal.
As a re-unied country Germany entered Euro 1992 in Sweden as world champions
and favorites for the title. Yet, in the rst match they were 0-1 behind against the
Commonwealth of Independent States, the rst successor to the Soviet-Union. Midelder
H assler prevented the upset defeat by a last-minute goal from a free-kick. In the fall of
1997, the Germans played some nerve-breaking preliminary matches for the 1998 World
Cup. For example, underdogs Albania were only beaten 4-3 by a last minute goal by
striker Bierho.
At the end of the 2002{003 season, Germany had to travel to the Farer Islands for
a preliminary match for the European championship 2004. After 88 minutes, the score
was still 0-0 and one of the greatest upsets in football history was about to take place.
The strikers Klose (89th minute) and Bobic (in injury time) led the Germans to a narrow
escape. Striker Neuville had already scored to eliminate Paraguay in the 2002 World Cup
in Japan and South-Korea two minutes before time. He again scored the winner, now
really in the nal minute, in the second group match against Poland in the 2002 World
Cup at home.
The semi-nal between Germany and Turkey during Euro 2008 was a hectic match.
Turkey took the lead, then Germany equalized, Germany seemed to have decided the
match eleven minutes before the end, but then Turkey equalized in the eighty-sixth minute.
However, right-footed left-back Lahm opened the door to the nal for Germany in the last
minute.
The successes of the German national team are sometimes attributed to German atti-
tude and planning: \The German national team plays the way its general sta prepared
for the war; games are meticulously planned, each player skilled in both attack and de-
6fense. Intricate pass patterns evolve, starting right in front of the German goal. Anything
achievable by human foresight, careful preparation and hard work is accounted for. (...)
At the same time, the German national team suers from the same disability as the famous
Schlieen plan for German strategy in World War I. There is a limit to human foresight;
psychological stress on those charged with executing excessively complex maneuvers can-
not be calculated in advance. If the German team falls behind, or if its intricate approach
yields no results, its game is shadowed by the underlying national premonition that in
the end even the most dedicated eort will go unrewarded, by the nightmare that ulti-
mately fate is cruel - a nightmare reinforced by the knowledge that the German media
are unmerciful when high expectations go unfullled. The impression is unavoidable that
an outstanding national soccer team has not brought a proportionate amount of joy to
a people that may not in its heart of hearts believe joy is the ultimate national destiny"
(Kissinger, 1986).
While the rst citation may make sense, the second quote may be stretching the
evidence too much. No team seems to have come back from a desperate position to get
victory or at least a shot at survival as frequently as the Germans. One should remember
the 1954 World Cup nal against Hungary, the 1966 World Cup nal against England,
the World Cup quarter nal against the same opponent in 1970, the semi-nal of the
European Championship against Yugoslavia in 1976, the nal of the same tournament
against Czechoslovakia, the semi-nal against France in 1982 World Cup, the nal against
Argentina in the 1986 World Cup, as well as the group match against Yugoslavia in the
1998 World Cup. All opponents were trailing by two goals, but the Germans gave them
at least a very hard time to secure victory.
3 Previous studies
Houston and Wilson (2002) study international football achievement of national teams us-
ing the FIFA world ranking of June 1999 as indicator. Using data from 179 countries, they
nd that per capita GDP has a positive but diminishing eect achievement. Furthermore,
population size and World Cup appearance have positive eects on football achievement.
The positive eect of population is related to the increased probability of having high
skilled football players in larger populations. The number of World Cup appearances is
7an indicator of a \learning curve".
Homann et al. (2002) examine the determinants of international football performance
using FIFA ranking for 76 countries. This ranking is calculated on a monthly basis us-
ing the performance of a giving country in all international matches, including friendly
matches, over the previous eight years. Points are awarded on the basis of the games'
results, goals scored, strength of the opponents, importance and venues of the matches
(home or away). They nd a positive but diminishing eect of per capita GDP.
Macmillan and Smith (2007) replicate Homann et al. (2002) using a larger sample
conrming earlier results of per capita GDP, size of population and experience in inter-
national matches to be important. As an alternative to the FIFA ranking they use the so
called \Elephant ranking", which excludes friendly games and is based on results in the
World Cup and Continental Championships including qualiers. The eect of the main
explanatory variables is quite identical.
Since July 2006 the FIFA ranking is the sum of the current year performance and
a three-year weighted average of previous annual performances. Annual performance is
measured by average points per game, which are determined by the outcome and the
importance of the match, the strength of the opponent and the strength of regional con-
federation. Leeds and Leeds (2009) use the new ranking to investigate how it is aected
by country-specic dierences, nding similar results as before; it helps to be big in terms
of population and rich in terms of per capita GDP.
Kuper and Szymanski (2009) explain why the Dutch national team have a better per-
formance than the English national team. Both national teams are not terribly successful
but \whereas the Netherlands die in beauty, England just dies". They perform an analysis
of (net) goal-scoring based on the eect of population size, per capita income and football
experience on football performance using data from 189 countries. Then they calculate
how England and the Netherlands real scores compare to the predicted scores from their
cross-country analysis. They nd that England does better than expected but not as much
better as the Netherlands does. Only Brazil does even better than the Netherlands. Ku-
per and Szymanski conclude that England does better than one would expect conditional
on the size of their population and per capita GDP. Conditional on its small population,
compared to for example Germany, Italy or Brazil, England does not underperform, it
8simply could not have done much better.
There is also research on the home advantage of football teams. Pollard and Pollard
(2005) providing a review of studies conclude that although there is clear evidence of a
home advantage in football, the causes of this advantage is not clear. It could be crowd
support although it not exactly clear how this works. A possible explanation is that the
noise of a home crowd is a cause of referee bias. However, in football matches between
national teams top-referees are selected which are probably less vulnerable to this. It could
simply be that the home advantage is psychological although this is hard to establish.
4 Data and empirical analysis
4.1 Data
Table 2 gives an overview of our information from 1564 country matches.4 Clearly the
number of matches increases over time. Whereas in the 1960s there were 180 matches
in the 1990s there were 346 matches. The increase in matches is partly related to a
change in set-up of the World Championship and the European Championship causing
teams to play more games. For example initially the World Championship had 16 teams
participating, from 1982 onwards this was 24 and from 1998 onwards 32 teams compete
at the tournament. Similarly, the number of nations competing in the nal tournament
of the European Championship was increased from 4 to 8 in 1980 and to 16 in 1996.
Furthermore, with the collapse of the former communist regimes in Eastern Europe the
number of countries has expanded a lot. The lowest number of matches is available for
Belgium (228) and Brazil (240). Germany provides the highest number of matches (344),
which has to do with the fact that until 1990 Germany consisted of two countries with
their own national team. Approximately 1 in 3 matches is a home match.
Table 3 shows the importance of scoring in the last minute or in the last ve minutes.
On average in 4.0 percent of the 1564 available matches a goal is scored in the last minute
(13.9 percent in the last ve minutes), while in 1.9 percent of the matches the countries got
a goal against (6.8 percent in the last ve minutes). Clearly the countries in our sample
4The data on the various matches in our sample are from various web-sites: Belgium: www.footbel.com;
Brazil: br.sambafoot.com; England: www.thefa.com; Germany: www.dfb.de; Italy: www.gc.it; Nether-
lands: www.voetbalstats.nl.
9predominantly have strong football teams as in the last time periods the number of goals
scored always exceed the number of goals incurred. The exception is Belgium who in 228
matches only have scored six goals in the last minute but also conceded half a dozen goals
in the last minute. From table 3 some conrmation about the validity of the German
goal-scoring myth may be derived. Whereas in 4.0 percent of all matches a goal is scored
in the last minute, German teams succeed to do this in 5.5 percent of their matches. Note,
however, that the Netherlands have even scored in the last minute in 5.9 percent of their
matches.
Dobson and Goddard (2001) argue that scoring rates tend to increase with the du-
ration of the match elapsed. A possible explanation is that players tend to get tired as
matches progress, increasing the likelihood of mistakes and therefore goals. An alterna-
tive explanation is that the scoring rate increases because of the rise in the probability
of the scores being unequal. Table 4 shows the intensities by which goals are scored and
conceded over the evolution of 90 minutes matches. In the rst quarter goals are scored
with an intensity of 1.7 percent per minute, while they are conceded with 0.7 percent
per minute. These frequencies go up in the second quarter of the matches. However,
the average goal-scoring intensity in the second quarter of the matches is as high as the
goal-scoring intensity between the 76th and the 85th minute of the match, 2.1 percent per
minute. The goal-conceding intensity increases gradually from 0.8 percent per minute in
the second quarter to 1.2 percent per minute between the 76th and the 85th minute of the
match. In other words, we hardly nd an increase in the scoring rates as the matches
evolve. It is possible that the quality of the players in the national teams is so high that
they do not get as tired towards the end of the game as is the case in domestic league
games where the average quality of the players is substantially lower. Nevertheless, the
goal-scoring and goal-conceding intensities are somewhat higher in the 86th to the 89th
minute and substantially higher in the last minute of the matches, an intensity of 3.9
percent for goals scored and 1.8 percent for goal conceded.5
Figure 1 shows the evolution of goal-scoring over the duration of the match for the
separate countries. Clearly, all countries score more goals than they concede, although
5Of course, this has to do with the fact that hardly any game lasts exactly ninety minutes, as usually
extra time is added. However, the same happens and the end of the rst half, which rarely lasts exactly
forty-ve minutes. The higher goal-scoring and goal-conceding rates are typical end-of-match phenomena.
10for Belgium the dierences between goal-scoring and goal-conceding are small. As shown,
for every country except Brazil and Italy, the goal-scoring intensity is higher in the last
minute than it is in the four minutes before that. Also, for every country except for Italy
and Brazil, the goal-conceding intensity in the last minute is lower than in the four minutes
before that. The increase in the goal-scoring intensity in the last minute is very large in
the England, Germany and the Netherlands. For Germany, there is a parallel increase in
the goal-scoring rate and the goal-conceding rate in the last minute. We will analyze the
goal-scoring and goal-conceding intensities in more detail below.
4.2 Parameter estimates exploratory analysis
We present simple and straightforward linear models to explain the probability to score
in the last minute (last ve minutes) of a game or conceding a goal in the last minute
(last ve minutes). Panel a of Table 5 shows the parameter estimates of a simple linear
probability model in which Brazil is the reference country and data from 1960 onwards are
used.6 As shown in the rst column there is no home advantage for scoring goals in the last
minute. Furthermore, England, Germany and the Netherlands are about 3.5{4.5 percent
more likely to score goals in the last minute than Brazil is. Belgium and Italy also have a
higher last minute goal-scoring probability than Brazil, but the parameter estimates are
not dierent from zero at conventional levels of signicance. The second column shows
that there is no home eect in conceding goals in the last minute either. Furthermore,
Belgium and Germany have a signicant higher probability than Brazil to concede a goal.
Germany is 4.5 percent more likely than Brazil to score a goal in the last minute, but also
4.3 percent more likely to concede a goal in the last minute. The third and fourth column
of panel a of Table 5 show that in the last ve minutes of a match there seems to be a
home advantage. Teams playing at home have a 4.2 percent higher probability to score
at home and a 2.3 percent lower probability to concede a goal at home. Furthermore,
the Netherlands have the highest probability to score a goal in the last ve minutes while
Germany has the highest probability to concede a goal in the last ve minutes of a match.
Clearly Germany is an \outlier" in terms of goal-scoring, as it is most likely to score
6Modeling football match results is sometimes done using an ordered probit specication (Dobson and
Goddard, 2001), but using this alternative specication does not change the main outcomes of our analysis.
11in the last minutes and also most likely to concede a goal in the last minutes. Sofar,
we ignored the fact that for a long period of time Germany had two national teams
representing East-Germany and West-Germany. Therefore, panel b of Table 5 shows the
parameter estimates when we limit the time period to 1990-2009. Basically, the pattern
of goal-scoring in the last minute is not much dierent, conrming the results presented
in panel a that Germany is more likely to score a goal and more likely to concede a goal
in the last minute than Brazil is.7 Also England and the Netherlands are more likely to
score a goal in the last minute.
4.3 Parameter estimates rates of scoring and conceding goals
To investigate the goal-scoring rates over the evolution of matches in more detail we use
a hazard model, in which the rate by which goals are scored is dependent on the elapsed
duration of the match t and some observed characteristics x, i.e. the country and the
calendar time period:




where k (= 1,..,5) is a subscript for duration interval and Ik(t) are time-varying dummy
variables that are one in subsequent duration intervals. We distinguish duration intervals
(in minutes): 1-15, 16-30, 31-45, 46-60, 61-75, 76-85, 86-89, 90. Because we also estimate
a constant term, we normalize 1 = 0. Furthermore,  represents a vector of parameters
and the 's are the main parameters of interest. The conditional density functions of the
durations until a goal is scored can be written as
f(t j x) = (t j x)exp( 
Z t
0
(s j x)ds) (2)
Assuming that conditional on the observed characteristics and the elapsed duration of the




(nklog(k)   kdk) (3)
7Note that the home advantage for goal-scoring and goal-conceding in the last ve minutes is no longer
signicantly dierent from zero.
12where nk represents the number of goals scored in interval k and dk is the duration of in-
terval k in minutes. We estimate the parameters of the model using Maximum Likelihood.
The goal-conceding rate is estimated similarly.
Table 6 shows the parameter estimates for the rates by which teams score and concede
goals. There is a clear home advantage. Teams playing at home score more goals and
concede fewer goals. The rst column gives the parameter estimates if we interact country
and goal-scoring intensity in the last minute { including stoppage time. As shown, goal-
scoring intensity is highest for Brazil and lowest for Belgium (the reference country). From
the second quarter to the 85th minute the goal-scoring intensity is higher than in the rst
quarter, but there is no obvious increase in goal-scoring intensity. From the 86th to the
89th minute the goal-scoring intensity and goal-conceding intensity increases. In the last
minute there is a dierence between on the one hand Belgium, Brazil and Italy for whom
the goal-scoring intensity does not increase signicantly and on the other hand England,
Germany and the Netherlands for whom the goal-scoring intensity is signicantly higher
than before.
The second column shows the parameter estimates if we restrict some of the interaction
terms between country and goals in the last minute. Those that were insignicant in the
rst estimate are restricted to zero. The interaction eects in the 90th minute for England,
Germany and the Netherlands are imposed to be the same. From a Likelihood-Ratio test
it appears that we cannot reject the statistical validity of these restrictions. In the third
column we restrict all interactions between country and duration intervals to be equal
to zero. A Likelihood Ratio test shows that in this case the value of the loglikelihood
drops signicantly, i.e. we cannot reject the hypothesis that these interaction terms are
signicantly dierent from zero. From this, we conclude that for the six countries in our
sample there is at most a mild increase in the goal-scoring intensity over the duration of
the match. The Netherlands, England and Germany exhibit a signicant higher scoring
intensity in the last minute.
The fourth to six columns of Table 6 show a similar analysis of the goal-conceding
rates. The goal-conceding rate was higher in the 1960s than in the following decades, but
over time the goal-conceding intensity did not change since the 1970s. Belgium has the
highest goal-conceding intensity, while Germany has the lowest. The other countries are
13not very dierent from each other. Over the duration of the match, the goal-conceding
intensity increases to remain approximately constant in the last 30 minutes of the match.
Above all, Germany has a substantially higher goal-conceding intensity in the 90th minute
than the other ve countries.8
4.4 Winning and losing in the \dying seconds"
Does it matter, whether teams play at home? It does matter, as shown in Table 7, where
we show the parameter estimates for the probability to win or lose a match. Teams are
about 20 percent more likely to win if they play at home and 12 to 16 percent less likely
to lose if they play at home. Does it matter whether a goal is scored in the last minute
in a game? It does, in fact it is very important. If a team scores in the last minute, it
is 21 to 26 percent more likely to win and 12 to 14 percent less likely to lose the match.
Table 7 also shows that all countries are more likely to win and less likely to lose than
Belgium. Over the period 1960{2009, Brazil has the highest probability to win a match.
However, over the period 1990{2009 Brazil does not do better than Germany, Italy or
the Netherlands. Except for Belgium, the probability to lose is not so much dierent for
the other countries. Brazil and Italy have the smallest probability to lose in the period
1960{2009. Over the more recent time period the dierences are minor.
5 Penalty shootouts
Sometimes goals in international tournaments are scored in penalty shootouts. When two
teams are tied in an elimination game, and extra time cannot provide a resolution, a
decision has to be reached dierently. Initially, a replay was the solution but from 1976
onwards in the European Championship and from 1982 onwards in the World Cup penalty
kicks were used to decide the game. The procedure is as follows. Five players from each
team take one kick each. If the score is still equal after these 10 kicks, one player from
each team takes a kick until one team has scored a goal more than the other from the
same number of kicks. Jordet et al. (2007) perform a statistical analysis to establish
the relationship between results of individual penalty kicks during a penalty shootout
8Note that we could not estimate a separate interaction parameter for Italy in the 90
th minute because
the Italians never conceded a goal in the last minute { or in stoppage time.
14and potential determinants such as stress, skill and fatigue. Analyzing the outcome of
penalty kicks in all 41 penalty shootouts and 409 kicks taken in the World Cup, European
Championships, and Copa America between 1976 and 2004 they nd that the importance
of the kicks { indicative of stress { was negatively related to the outcomes of the kicks,
whereas skill and fatigue were less, or not, related to outcome.
Table 8 gives an overview of penalty shootouts in the World Cup and Continental
Championships. Belgium participated only once in a penalty shootout during the 1986
World Cup and won (against Spain). The other national teams participated many times
in penalty shootouts with striking dierences. Whereas England, Italy and the Nether-
lands have a poor performance, Brazil has a much better performance, and Germany
has an excellent performance with ve wins (against France, Mexico, Argentina and Eng-
land (twice)) and only one loss (West-Germany against Czechoslovakia in the nal of the
1976 European Championship). With the exception of the Belgium national team which
participated in penalty shootouts only once, the German national team has the highest
percentage of goals scored from penalty kicks in penalty shootouts { 94 percent in the
World Cup and 90 percent in the European Championship.
6 Conclusions
Scoring goals is a team eort, although it helps to have a good striker who makes it easier
to transfer team eort into results. Scoring goals is also determined by the support of
the crowd watching the game. We nd that national teams have a clear home advantage
when playing important matches. On average they are more likely to score goals and less
likely to concede goals. On average, the probability to win a match is almost 20% higher
if played at home while the probability to lose a match is about 15% lower if played at
home. The probability to win a match is also determined by the quality of the team.
Although the dierences between the best national teams tend to get smaller. Overall in
the period 1960-2009 Brazil had a much better track record of winning games than for
example Italy, Germany, England and the Netherlands. However, this is determined by
the performance in the early years as over the period 1990-2009 the dierences are much
smaller. Dierences between national teams not only occur in terms of overall goal scoring
and goal conceding or in the probabilities to win or lose but also in the evolution of goal
15scoring over the course of the match. Apparently not only skills but also national identity
seems to matter.
We tried to relate our ndings to work on national identity to Hofstede's work on
culture. Hofstede (1980) demonstrated that there are national cultural groupings that
aect the behavior of organizations, distinguishing several dimensions. We nd support
for the idea that there are dierences in national identity which aect goal scoring behavior
of national teams. However, the dierences in behavior between national teams cannot be
related on any of these dimensions.9
Sugden and Tomlinson (1998) note that football is used as a vehicle for the expression of
nationalism and for the promotion of individual nations' power and status internationally.
As discussed before, in the decades after World War II Germany football contributed to
the process of nation building. According to Foer (2004) with increasing globalization
one would expect football games local cultures to disappear. However, this does not
seem to be the case. National teams reect the particular social and political climate of
countries. The behavior of national teams seems to be related to country-specic cultural
characteristics.10
According Kuper and Szymanski (2009) football \culture" is becoming less important.
Football coaches from Spain, Italy and France are working in the English Premier League;
Dutch coaches are working all over the world. Thus, technical dierences between teams
in terms of tactics and strategy are disappearing. International competitive forces induce
9In particular the goal scoring behavior of the German national team is dicult to explain using
Hofstede's dimensions of national identity. For example, there are high scores for Italians on \masculinity",
for English on \individualism" and Belgians on \uncertainty avoidance" and low scores for Dutch on
\masculinity, Brazilians on \individualism" and English on \uncertainty avoidance". The German goal
scoring behavior is an outlier while in terms of Hofstede's dimensions the German are \middle of the road".
10Miguel et al. (2008) present an analysis of the relationship between national cultural norms and
violence in football games. They focus on the civil war history in a player's country and his level of
violence in football matches. Violence is measured by the number of yellow cards { cautioning the player
after a foul { and red cards { sending the player o. Their analysis is based on information about players
from seventy nationalities in matches in the football seasons 2004/05 and 2005/06 in ve national leagues
(England, France, Germany, Italy, Spain) and the UEFA Champions League. The authors conclude that
the player's home country's history of civil conict is strongly associated with violent behavior during soccer
matches, which they consider to be support for the idea that national cultures of violence accompany the
football players as they move to Europe (see also Kuper, 2006).
16the best players to move to competitions where the highest salaries are paid: England
(Premier League), Spain (La Liga) and Italy (Serie A). Also at the level of national teams
dierences are becoming smaller since players play all over Europe in various clubs. Still,
there may be cultural dierences that remain at the level of national teams, maybe not in
tactics or in strategy but in ghting spirit. This is what we nd in our empirical analysis.
A popular myth in football is that the German national team is never defeated until
the last whistle is blown. This is conrmed in matches that were decided through penalty
shootouts. The German national team outperforms the other ve countries, both during
World Cup matches and the European championships. Furthermore, the German national
team is more likely to score in the \dying seconds" of a match than other national teams
are. We expose this myth to an empirical test by investigating goal-scoring in the last
minutes of important international matches. We nd that indeed Germans are more likely
to score in the last minute of important games than other countries are. However, also
England and the Netherlands are more likely to score a goal in the last minute whereas
Germany is also more likely to concede a goal in the last minute.
So, whereas in goal-scoring there is a random element which makes football matches
all the more exciting to watch, there is also persistence in performance of national teams
with Brazil and Germany almost always performing well. Surprisingly, there is also a
country-specic element in goal-scoring in the last minutes of football matches. Whereas
general performance has to do with talent, goal-scoring in the last minutes seems to be
related to attitude. Whereas the national team from Brazil and Italy do not like to lose
and reduce their eort to score a goal in the last minutes for to avoid conceding a goal
England, Germany and the Netherlands are risk seeking, increasing their eort to score a
goal at the risk of conceding one. Only for Germany we nd that the risk of conceding a
goal increases signicant. Apparently, Germany wants to win whatever the costs may be.
Comparative to the home advantage, the eect of goal scoring in the last minute on
the probability to win a match is quite large. Nevertheless, goal scoring in the last minute
does not happen very often. Therefore, the eects of the German attitude on winning a
match, though signicant, is small.
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19Table 1: Participation and nalists in Continental and World Championships,
1960{2008
a. Continental Championship
Country Participation Winner Runner-up
Belgium 4 { 1980
Brazil 13* 1989, 1997, 1999, 2004, 2007 1983, 1991, 1995
England 7 { {
Germany 12 1972, 1980, 1996 1976, 1992, 2008
Italy 7 1968 2000
Netherlands 8 1988 {
b. World Championship
Country Participation Winner Runner-up
Belgium 7 { {
Brazil 12* 1962, 1970, 1994, 2002 1998
England 9 1966 {
Germany 12* 1974, 1990 1966, 1982, 1986, 2002
Italy 12* 1982, 2006 1970, 1994
Netherlands 6 { 1974, 1978
Note: Participation refers to the number of times a national team participated in a tournament. A * indicates that
a national team was present in every tournament.
Table 2: Number of matches by time period
Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total Home
Belgium 23 41 57 47 60 228 98
Brazil 21 38 39 55 87 240 59
England 26 35 53 53 65 232 94
Germany 49 81 90 61 63 344 132
Italy 36 42 43 69 77 267 100
Netherlands 25 50 47 61 70 253 104
Total 180 287 329 346 422 1564 587
20Table 3: Number of matches with last minutes goal-scoring
Last minute Last ve minutes Total
Country For Against For Against matches
Belgium 6 6 24 21 228
Brazil 5 1 30 15 240
England 12 2 32 9 232
Germany 19 15 49 34 344
Italy 6 1 31 16 267
Netherlands 15 4 51 11 253
Total 63 29 217 106 1564
Total (%) 4.0 1.9 13.9 6.8 100.0
Table 4: Goal-scoring intensity (percentage per minute)
Minutes For Against Dierence
1{15 1.7 0.7 1.0
16{30 2.1 0.8 1.3
31{45 2.0 0.8 1.2
46{60 2.0 0.9 1.1
61{75 2.1 1.0 1.1
76{85 2.1 1.0 1.1
86{89 2.4 1.2 1.2
90 3.9 1.8 2.1
Note: Based on 1531 matches without extra time; also note that the 90th minute includes extra time.
21Table 5: Parameter estimates goal-scoring and goal-conceding in the nal stage
of a football match
Last minute Last ve minutes
Country For Against For Against
a. 1960{2009
Home 0.010 (1.0) -0.004 (0.5) 0.042 (2.3)** -0.023 (1.9)*
Belgium 0.009 (0.6) 0.025 (2.2)** -0.024 (0.8) 0.034 (1.4)
England 0.034 (1.9)* 0.006 (0.8) 0.008 (0.3) -0.020 (1.0)
Germany 0.043 (2.7)** 0.044 (3.6)** 0.018 (0.6) 0.040 (1.8)*
Italy 0.003 (0.2) 0.001 (0.2) -0.013 (0.5) -0.003 (0.2)
Netherlands 0.041 (2.3)** 0.014 (1.5) 0.072 (2.2)** -0.014 (0.7)
b. 1990{2009
Home 0.014 (0.7) 0.001 (0.1) 0.017 (0.6) -0.024 (1.4)
Belgium 0.024 (1.0) 0.030 (1.7) -0.003 (0.1) 0.055 (1.5)
England 0.054 (2.0)** 0.010 (0.7) 0.046 (1.1) -0.007 (0.3)
Germany 0.061 (2.2)** 0.042 (2.0)** 0.023 (0.6) 0.022 (0.7)
Italy 0.013 (0.6) 0.000 (0.0) 0.015 (0.4) -0.017 (0.6)
Netherlands 0.070 (2.5)** 0.024 (1.4) 0.137 (2.9)** -0.004 (0.2)
Note: Number of matches: 1960-2009: 1564; 1990-2009: 768; Brazil = reference country; note that the 90th minute
includes extra time; parameters of linear probability models; in parentheses absolute t statistics based on robust
standard errors; all estimates contain calendar period xed eects.
22Table 6: Parameter estimates goal-scoring and goal-conceding rates; 90 minutes
matches
goal-scoring rates goal-conceding rates
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Home 0.37 (10.0)** 0.37 (10.0)** 0.37 (10.1)** -0.42 (6.8)** -0.42 (6.9)** -0.42 (6.9)**
Countries
Brazil 0.35 (5.1)** 0.35 (5.1)** 0.35 (5.1)** -0.45 (4.8)** -0.47 (5.0)** -0.47 (5.0)**
England 0.20 (2.9)** 0.19 (2.8)** 0.21 (3.0)** -0.54 (5.2)** -0.55 (5.7)** -0.55 (5.7)**
Germany 0.24 (3.8)** 0.24 (3.7)** 0.25 (4.0)** -0.29 (3.5)** -0.30 (3.6)** -0.27 (3.3)**
Italy 0.09 (1.2) 0.08 (1.1) 0.08 (1.1) -0.55 (5.8)** -0.56 (5.8)** -0.58 (6.0)**
Netherlands 0.28 (4.2)** 0.28 (4.2)** 0.29 (4.4)** -0.42 (4.5)** -0.43 (4.6)** -0.43 (4.6)**
Duration (minutes)
16-30 0.20 (2.8)** 0.20 (2.9)** 0.20 (2.9)** 0.16 (1.5) 0.16 (1.5) 0.16 (1.5)
31-45 0.15 (2.1)** 0.15 (2.2)** 0.15 (2.2)** 0.09 (0.8) 0.09 (0.8) 0.09 (0.8)
46-60 0.18 (2.4)** 0.18 (2.4)** 0.18 (2.4)** 0.23 (2.1)** 0.23 (2.1)** 0.23 (2.1)**
60-75 0.22 (3.0)** 0.22 (3.1)** 0.22 (3.1)** 0.36 (3.4)** 0.36 (3.4)** 0.36 (3.4)**
76-85 0.20 (2.5)** 0.20 (2.6)** 0.20 (2.6)** 0.31 (2.7)** 0.31 (2.7)** 0.31 (2.7)**
86-89 0.36 (3.5)** 0.36 (3.5)** 0.36 (3.6)** 0.55 (3.8)** 0.55 (3.8)** 0.55 (3.8)**
90 0 ({) 0.39 (1.5) 0.82 (5.8)** 0 ({) 0.73 (2.7)** 0.95 (4.7)**
Belgium 0.28 (0.7) 0 ({) 0 ({) 0.44 (1.0) 0 ({) 0 ({)
Brazil -0.22 (0.5) 0 ({) 0 ({) -1.01 (1.0) 0 ({) 0 ({)
England 0.59 (1.8)* 0.67 (2.3)** 0 ({) 0.27 (0.6) 0 ({) 0 ({)
Germany 0.75 (2.9)** 0.67 (2.3)** 0 ({) 1.15 (3.8)** 0.96 (2.6)** 0 ({)
Italy 0.08 (0.2) 0 ({) 0 ({)  1  1 0 ({)
Netherlands 0.75 (2.7)** 0.67 (2.3)** 0 ({) 0.57 (1.1) 0 ({) 0 ({)
-Loglikelihood 13,582.0 13,582.4 13,585.3 6,887.1 6,888.5 6,895.7
LR-test statistics
(1)-(2) 0.8 2.8
(2)-(3) 5.8 ** 14.4 **
Note: Based on 1531 90-minutes matches; note that the 90th minute includes extra time; note that for Italy for
goal-conceding in the last minute no parameter could be estimated since Italy never conceded a goal in the last
minute of a 90 minute match; calendar period dummies are included; in parentheses absolute t statistics based on
robust standard errors.
23Table 7: Probability to win or to lose a football match
Probability to win Probability to lose
1960-2009 1990-2009 1960-2009 1990-2009
Home 0.19 (7.6)** 0.18 (5.0)** -0.16 (9.0)** -0.12 (5.0)**
Scoring last minute 0.26 (5.6)** 0.21 (3.5)** -0.14 (3.8)** -0.12 (3.7)**
Conceding last minute -0.15 (1.8)* -0.16 (1.4) 0.07 (0.8) 0.10 (0.9)
Brazil 0.20 (4.5)** 0.21 (3.4)** -0.20 (5.3)** -0.22 (4.0)**
England 0.11 (2.4)* 0.11 (1.7) -0.14 (3.8)** -0.18 (3.3)**
Germany 0.13 (3.1)** 0.19 (3.0)** -0.16 (4.3)** -0.22 (4.1)**
Italy 0.12 (2.9)** 0.18 (2.3)** -0.18 (5.0)** -0.24 (4.6)**
Netherlands 0.13 (3.0)** 0.16 (2.6)** -0.12 (3.1)** -0.18 (3.3)**
R2 0.106 0.101 0.108 0.104
Note: Based on 1564 (1960-2009) and 768 (1990-2009) matches; in panel a. Belgium = reference country;
parameters of linear probability models; in parentheses absolute t statistics based on robust standard errors.
24Table 8: Penalty shootouts
a. World Cup
Won Lost Total Years Scored (%)
Belgium 1 0 1 1986 100
Brazil 2 1 3 1986, 1994, 1998 77
England 0 3 3 1990, 1998, 2006 50
Germany 4 0 4 1982, 1986, 1990, 2006 94
Italy 1 3 4 1990, 1994, 1998, 2006 65
Netherlands 0 1 1 1998 50
b. Continental Championship
Belgium 0 0 0 { {
Brazil 4 2 6 1993, 1995 (2), 2004 (2), 2007 84
England 1 2 3 1996 (2), 2004 82
Germany 1 1 2 1976, 1996 90
Italy 1 2 3 1980, 2000, 2008 76
Netherlands 1 3 4 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 70
Source: http://www.penaltyshootouts.co.uk/tournaments.html
25Figure 1: Intensity of goal-scoring and goal-conceding (Percentage per minute)
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Note that the 90th minute includes extra time.
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